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The Firms Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about 
Constraints on Private Sector Development    
 
 
 
Geeta Batra, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrew H. W. Stone* 
 
What do active managers view as their main obstacles to operation and growth of their firms?  
What conditions are associated with a higher level of enterprise growth?  Why do firms so 
frequently opt to function unofficially?  What makes reforms so difficult, especially in countries 
with influential private firms?  Is corruption less harmful to business operation when it is 
predictable?   
 
Listening to what managers and entrepreneurs say about the obstacles they face,  especially 
through structured surveys, has proven to be an effective way to evaluate the constraints a 
particular business environment imposes.1 This information is important not only for the firms 
themselves but for the growth of the larger economy and the progress of society.  If private 
enterprises are a critical path out of poverty2 through employment or ownership, then 
establishing conditions for their growth must be a key component of a poverty-reduction 
strategy. The enabling conditions for enterprise growth and operation are often referred to as the 
business environment.  The World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey (WBES) offers 
important insights as to what is needed to improve the business environment, based on what 
businesses themselves say about conditions they need to grow and the impediments they face. 
 
 
What is the World Business Environment Survey?   
  
The WBES represents a major effort by the World Bank Group and partner institutions to 
implement a standard core enterprise survey to evaluate business conditions in a large, cross-
regional set of member countries. The survey  was administered on a roughly parallel basis in all 
80 countries throughout the world, plus the West Bank and Gaza (for a list of countries, see 
Appendix A). It uses a uniform methodology and parallel parameters for sample structure. In 
general, at least 100 firms were surveyed in each country. The WBES sought to assess the state 
of the enabling environment---the conditions for private enterprise growth, focusing on local 
economic policy, governance3, regulatory, infrastructure and financial  barriers, and services to 
businesses.  The survey represents an important step toward standardizing evaluations of the 
conditions for private investment in developing and transition countries around the world. It 
provides a basis to make regional comparisons of investment climate and business environment 
conditions. Furthermore, it permits comparisons of the severity of constraints affecting enterprise 
depending on their characteristics, such as size or ownership.4 
 
                                                 
1  See Stone (1992). 
2  See IFC (2000). 
3 Governance here refers primarily to the degree of corruption, as well as qualities of the state in underpinning 
markets, such as transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. 
4 Readers may access the core dataset of WBES at http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_ica_resources.htm 
and apply an interactive webtool to explore the data at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/.  
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The results are particularly important in the context of economic globalization. Against a 
backdrop of growing competition and globalization, member countries are increasingly 
concerned  about the conduciveness of their business environment to private investment  and 
business development, and their relative standing in their region or globally. Unfortunately, there 
are very few indicators that allow objective measurement and comparison of the business 
environment, its binding constraints, and the quality and integrity of supportive and regulatory 
public services. Nor have there been adequate  benchmarks  of the relative change in the severity 
of constraints  and the quality of business services  over time. The WBES sought to fill that gap. 
 
The WBES team sought to accomplish the following objectives:  
 
· To provide feed back from enterprises on the state of the private sector. 
· To measure the quality of governance and public services including the extent of corruption. 
· To provide better information on constraints to private sector growth, from the enterprise 
perspective. 
· To sensitize client governments to the importance of listening to firms and using this 
information to critically assess policies.  
· To establish the basis for internationally comparable indicators which can track changes in 
the business environment over time, thus allowing an assessment of the impact of market-
oriented reforms on private enterprises.  
· To stimulate systematic public-private dialogue on business perceptions and the agenda for 
reform. 
 
The surveys were carried out over a period of roughly one and a half years between the end of 
1998 and the middle of  2000. Data were collected though personal interviews conducted at the 
managerial level in enterprises in most regions, with the exception of Africa, where surveys by 
mail predominated. Response rates were generally high, with the exception of responses to 
questions on bribery. By region, response rates were among the lowest in Africa. The analyses in 
this report are based on a sample of 10,032 enterprises that responded to the core questionnaire. 
 
Table 9-1 presents the regional breakdown of firms by size and sector. Both small and medium 
enterprises, or SMEs, (those with 500 or fewer workers) and large firms (those with 501 or more 
employees), were sampled in the WBES.  As shown in Table 9-1, SMEs comprised the clear 
majority of samples (80 percent), with an almost equal proportion of small enterprises (50 or 
fewer employees) and medium enterprises (51-500 employees). Large firms accounted for about 
20 percent of the sample.  In terms of firm age, on average, the youngest average sample age of 
firms was for those in Central and Eastern Europe (9.5 years). The oldest was in OECD (34.1 
years).  
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Table 9-1:   Distribution of WBES Sample by Region, Size and Sector (percent of firms) 
  
  Manufacturing 
Services/ 
Commerce Agriculture Construction Other Total Firms 
Small 16.7 28.9 5.7 24.2 24.4 508 
Medium 30.1 26.8 8.0 16.3 18.8 485 
Large 36.6 25.4 8.7 14.0 15.4 358 
Total 26.8 27.2 7.3 18.7 20.0 1351 
MENA         
Small 60.0 20.0 0.0 8.9 11.1 45 
Medium 31.6 35.5 6.6 7.9 18.4 76 
Large 31.0 41.4 8.6 8.6 10.3 58 
Total 38.5 33.5 5.6 8.4 14.0 179 
East Asia/NIC China           
Small 43.21 39.51 4.94 11.11 1.23 134 
Medium 64.12 20 1.76 12.35 1.76 89 
Large 82.57 9.17 1.83 6.42 0.0 78 
Total 65 21.11 2.5 10.28 1.11 301 
East Asia Developing       
Small 36.4 54.5 3.5 5.6 0.0 536 
Medium 48.7 45.5 1.1 4.7 0.0 279 
Large 68.8 28.1 3.1 0.0 0.0 128 
Total 44.4 48.3 2.8 4.6 0.0 943 
SOUTH ASIA           
Small 50.0 40.6 0.9 8.5 0.0 106 
Medium 63.4 22.6 2.7 11.3 0.0 186 
Large 79.2 12.3 1.9 6.6 0.0 106 
Total 64.1 24.6 2.0 9.3 0.0 398 
Latin America       
Small  36.4 53.6 2.0 8.1 0.0 459 
Medium 45.1 47.1 1.5 6.3 0.0 669 
Large 53.4 38.5 3.5 4.6 0.0 481 
Total 45.1 46.4 2.2 6.3 0.0 1609 
OECD             
Small 21.7 64.5 1.3 12.6 0.0 318 
Medium 30.3 60.2 1.0 8.3 0.0 389 
Large 33.5 63.5 0.6 2.4 0.0 167 
Total 27.8 62.36 1.0 8.7 0.0 874 
CIS        
Small 20.8 63.5 4.4 8.2 3.1 903 
Medium 49.3 34.7 5.7 6.6 3.7 683 
Large 60.3 27.0 6.3 5.2 1.1 174 
Total 35.8 48.7 5.1 7.3 3.1 1760 
CEE             
Small 21.9 60.6 7.2 9.9 0.4 718 
Medium 29.2 27.7 30.2 12.9 0.1 902 
Large 54.3 12.4 28.7 4.7 0.0 129 
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Total 28.0 40.1 20.6 11.0 0.2 1749 
Note: Table omits firms that could not be classified by main activity and size due to missing information. 
 
WHAT DO ACTIVE MANAGERS VIEW AS THEIR MAIN OBSTACLES TO 
OPERATION AND GROWTH?   
 
The survey asked respondents to rate how problematic were a set of general constraints for the 
growth and operation of their firm. Table 9-2 presents the ranking of responses for the world, by 
regional groups and by individual region to the following question: “Please judge on a four-point 
scale how problematic are the following factors for the operation and growth of your firm.” Four 
constraints stand out (based on a simple average for the overall world sample): taxes and 
regulations, financing, policy uncertainty/instability and inflation.   Indeed, if we were to focus 
on a simple average for the overall world sample, the following constraints stand out: taxes and 
regulations, financing, policy uncertainty/instability, and inflation.  
 
Yet such worldwide average results mask crucial differences across regions, and particularly 
between industrialized and developing countries. For OECD, newly industrialized East Asian 
countries, and transition economies, the leading obstacles identified by the firms where indeed 
taxes and regulations, financing, policy instability, and inflation. However, for developing 
regions as a group (Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean, LAC; Middle East/North Africa, 
MENA; South Asia; and East Asia) the leading constraint is corruption, followed by inflation, 
financing, policy instability, and infrastructure. Indeed, in four developing regions, South Asia, 
Africa, developing East Asia and MENA, corruption figures as one of the three leading 
constraints.  
 
Other important regional differences emerge as we examine individual regions.  For example, in 
Developing East Asia, street crime imposes the leading constraint, whereas in Africa, 
infrastructure problems are identified as one of the top three constraints. In Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), inflation ties with taxes and regulations as the leading constraints. The large 
variance across regions (and countries) in the severity assigned by responding firms to the 
various constraints points to the importance of assessing the results by region and country, rather 
than relying on worldwide averages.  For Africa and East Asia, taxes and regulations are notably 
absent from the leading constraints.  Surprisingly, in Transition Europe (CIS and CEE), although 
corruption is quite prevalent in the region and an important problem for about half the firms, it is 
not among the top four constraints.   
 
Tax and regulatory constraints were also rated individually in a separate question.  Among these 
constraints,  “high taxes” led in every region.  Since taxes are generally a significant cost of 
doing business, it is not surprising that most businesses internationally regard them as too high. 
“Tax regulations and administration” led the remaining list of regulatory constraints.  Customs 
and trade regulation were identified as the next leading regulatory constraint in Latin America, 
Africa, Developing East Asia, and MENA; while in OECD, South Asia and Newly Industrialized 
East Asia labor regulations rank next.  In Central and Eastern Europe alone, business registration 
imposes the leading constraint after taxes.  It is noteworthy that the great majority of firms in 
Newly Industrialized East Asia did not identify high taxes as a serious constraint, and were 
predominantly not seriously constrained by any category of regulation.  
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Table 9-2:   Leading Constraints 
 Leading Constraint Second constraint Third constraint Fourth Constraint 
World Taxes and Regulations Financing Policy Instability Inflation 
OECD & Newly Industrialized East Asia 
(including China) Taxes and Regulations Financing Policy Instability Inflation 
Transition Europe  Taxes and Regulations Financing Inflation Policy Instability 
Developing countries (Africa, MENA, East 
Asia Developing, South Asia, Latin America) Corruption Inflation Financing 
Policy Instability/ 
Infrastructure (tie) 
Africa Financing Corruption Infrastructure Inflation 
MENA Policy Instability Corruption Inflation Exchange Rate 
East Asia NIC/China Financing Inflation 
Anti-competitive 
practices Policy Instability 
East Asia Developing Street Crime Corruption Inflation/Exchange Rate/Organized Crime (tie) 
South Asia Corruption/Policy Instability (tie) Inflation Infrastructure 
Latin America Taxes and Regulations Policy Instability Street Crime Financing 
OECD Taxes and Regulations Financing Policy Instability Inflation 
CIS Taxes and Regulations Financing Policy Instability Inflation 
CEE Taxes and Regulations/Inflation (tie) Financing Policy Instability 
 
Finance. The second leading general constraint for the global sample is financing (Table 9.3). 
Firms in Central and Eastern Europe are most likely to identify it as seriously constraining, 
followed by those in CIS countries, and then those in Africa, South Asia and Latin America. 
Globally, while financing is identified as the second-leading constraint by small and medium 
enterprises, it ranks as fourth for large enterprises.    
 
Table 9-3:  Financing Constraints (percent of firms rating constraint “major” or “moderate") 
 
Financing Constraints 
 Africa MENA 
East Africa 
NIC/China 
East Asia 
Developing 
South 
Asia 
Latin 
America OECD CIS CEE 
High interest rates 83.5 67.4 40.3 72.5 83.9 87.6 47.8 80.6 79.5 
Lack access to long term loan n.a. n.a. 31.2 52.0 65.1 63.1 20.0 58.7 67.0 
Collateral requirements 519 45.2 30.1 43.6 58.5 65.1 35.7 49.7 52.2 
Bank paperwork 47.1 51.6 29.9 34.6 56.6 63.0 38.9 52.9 48.3 
Inadequate credit info on 
clients 
51.7 46.3 27.0 48.4 46.7 46.1 23.5 40.1 41.6 
Special connections 38.2 33.3 26.3 39.6 44.5 46.5 26.5 35.1 43.1 
Banks lack money to lend 28.4 33.0 20.6 52.2 35.1 39.1 14.3 37.4 46.8 
Access to specialized export 
finance 
44.9 39.8 15.1 33.7 36.4 34.7 16.5 35.5 38.8 
Access to non-bank equity 43.1 36.2 13.0 32.6 34.9 35.6 18.1 38.3 42.0 
Access to lease finance 38.2 29.3 13.1 34.9 32.9 34.1 19.3 32.7 48.9 
Access to foreign banks 43.6 29.3 11.7 41.5 33.9 35.0 11.1 35.3 40.4 
Corruption of bank officials 23.5 27.4 19.0 45.1 28.9 18.6 5.7 24.3 29.3 
 
Sources of finance vary markedly by region (Table 9-4). While internal funds (retained earnings) 
provided the leading source of financing across regions, in South Asia and Latin America, 
domestic commercial banks provide 20 percent of investment finance, and in developing East  
Asia and OECD around 15 percent. In Africa, internal funds (retained earnings) appeared as the  
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most common source of finance, followed by “own capital or equity”.  Because of different 
measurement methods, data for Africa cannot be compared to those for other regions. 
 
Table 9-4:  Sources of Finance (percent of total by region) 
 
Policy Uncertainty and Instability  
 
Firms’ views of this constraint vary  widely by region (Figure 9-1). At one extreme, more than 
70 percent of firms in South Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Developing East Asia report 
policy instability as seriously constraining, with firms in Latin America, MENA, and CIS close 
behind. By contrast, only 26 percent of firms in East Asia NIC and China identified this 
constraint as “major” or “moderate”, and also only 37 percent of firms in OECD countries did so. 
  
Firms differ by region in the particular dimension of policy instability that troubles them. Over 
70 percent of firms in CEE, over 60 percent of firms in CIS countries and Developing East Asia, 
and about half of firms in LAC find economic and financial policies unpredictable. In CEE and 
Africa, nearly three quarters of firms rated changes in rules, laws and regulations affecting them 
as being unpredictable, while two-thirds of firms did so in CIS. With regard to advance 
notification of changes in laws and policies affecting them, 68 percent of firms in CEE, 60 
percent of CIS firms, and 57 percent Latin American firms responding reported that they were 
“seldom” or “never” notified in advance of changes affecting them. Finally, there is a question of 
whether government considers businesses’ views in the formulation of legal and policy changes. 
In Transition Europe, MENA and Latin America the majority of firms suggest that this is 
relatively rare. 
East Asia 
NIC/China
East Asia 
Dev
South 
Asia
Latin 
America OECD CIS CEE
Internal funds/
Retained Earnings 48.3 33.9 26.5 43.2 39.1 53.9 70.5
Local commercial 
banks 11.6 15.7 18.5 19.8 14.6 11.4 4.8
Family/Friends 3.3 9.9 6.3 4.3 2.3 8.6 7.3
Supplier Credit 7.9 3.2 2.5 10.2 4.8 4.6 5.8
Equity, sale of stock 5.8 2.7 6.4 3.2 8.5 8.6 1.4
Other State Sources 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.9 2.0 4.6 7.4
Foreign Banks 3.3 4.8 2.6 4.0 1.5 2.1 0.6
Leasing Arrangement 2.1 0.7 1.3 1.3 3.3 3.6 2.6
Other 1.1 1.8 5.5 2.9 1.5 1.4 1.4
Investment Funds/ 
Special Development 
Finance 2.6 1.2 4.4 2.2 2.3 1.7 1.3
Moneylenders 2.9 1.7 1.1 1.1 2.3 2.5 1.6
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Figure 9-1:  Policy Instability by Region (percent of firms responding 3 or 4 [seriously 
constraining). 
 
Corruption and Governance  
 
Corruption is identified as a serious constraint by over 70 percent of firms in South Asia and 
nearly as many in Developing East Asia and MENA (Table 9-5). Sixty-four percent of firms in 
Africa, almost 60 percent of those in Latin America and about half in the CIS and Central and 
Eastern Europe report it a serious impediment. This contrasts with the much lower share (about 
20 percent) of firms in NIC East Asia/China5 and in OECD countries that rate it as a “major” or 
“moderate” obstacle. Further, in many of the developing countries, the majority of firms reported 
that it was common “in their line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments’ 
to get things done”. The data on firms’ reported percentage of total revenue paid every year in 
bribes clearly and positively correlate with the data on the degree to which firms find corruption 
constraining. An important manifestation of weak governance is the extent to which registered 
firms operate unofficially.  Related to this is the degree to which firms comply with tax laws. 
While there are variations from region to region, about half the firms in the global sample  
indicated that they report no more than 80 percent of their revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The subcontractor carrying out the survey in China could ask only this general constraint question about 
corruption.  Thus, no data from further detailed questions on this topic was therefore obtained.  
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Figure 9-5:  Indicators of Corruption by Region (percent of firms that responded “always,” 
“mostly,” or “frequently,” as opposed to “sometimes,” “seldom,” or “never”) 
Region  
Irregular additional 
payments Made 
to government 
officials "to get 
things done" 
Advance 
knowledge 
of amount of 
additional 
payment 
Service 
delivered 
as agreed if  
additonal 
payment 
made6 
If payment made to 
one official, another 
govt official will 
request  
payment for same 
service 
If government official 
acts against rules, can go 
to superior and get 
correct treatment without 
recourse to unofficial 
payment 
South Asia 65 50 83 46 32 
East Asia Developing 62 60 76 60 26 
Africa 52 not asked 33 not asked not asked 
MENA 36 not asked 53 not asked not asked 
CEE 33 48 73 28 36 
CIS 29 46 75 35 38 
Latin America 28 70 32 70 69 
OECD 12 26 62 17 45 
East Asia NIC/China 11 22 42 10 25 
Total 13 53 59 45 45 
 
Quality of Public Services    
 
About two-thirds of firms in Central Europe, Latin America, and the CIS countries, and nearly 
60 percent in South Asia, report that the government is inefficient in delivering services (Table 
9-6). The evaluation varies according to  types of public services and institutions. On average, 
the majority of firms give a negative evaluation for public health, parliament, and public 
works/roads, while over 40 percent negatively evaluate the courts, police, education services, and 
central government leadership. By contrast, the most positive ratings go to the postal, telephone 
and electric power services.  
 
                               Table 9-6  Government Efficiency 
                               (percent of firms that rate a 4,5, or 6 [inefficient]) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This question is answered only by firms acknowledging that payments are made:  for example, for OECD, 62% 
means that among the 12% of responding firms that acknowledge that payments are required, 62% reported that 
services paid for are delivered as agreed.   This works out to only about 7% of all survey respondents. 
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Firm Characteristics   
 
The rich details of the WBES dataset permits an investigation of how a variety of firm 
characteristics, such as size and type of ownership, affect their experience and perceptions of 
constraints. For example, the data allow an investigation of whether the implicit ‘tax’ imposed by 
inappropriate government policies and regulations is evenly or unevenly distributed across 
different types of firms within a country. To do so, the authors analyzed the influence of firm 
characteristics on their response to key potential obstacles to business operation and growth, 
using a multivariate regression approach to control for country effects.   
 
The econometric review (see Table 9-7, below) suggests that firms that are private, smaller, 
newer, devoid of foreign direct investment (FDI), and cater to the domestic market generally 
tend to face more acute business constraints than firms that are older, larger, exporting, have 
FDI, and/or are State-Owned (SOEs).7   There are some notable exceptions regarding some 
business constraints, however.  Older firms report being more constrained by political instability 
than younger firms, and exporters are hit harder by inflation than non-exporters, for instance.   
 
A detailed reading of the data suggests the complex interaction of firm characteristics with 
business environment conditions.  For example, corruption is seen as more constraining by 
smaller and younger firms, but also by those with government or public ownership and those that 
export.  An inadequate exchange rate regime appears to be felt more by medium-sized firms, 
younger firms and those with some state ownership.   
 
In terms of firm size, globally on average, small and medium firms report being more 
constrained than large firms along most dimensions,8   Within SMEs small firms are generally 
more constrained than medium-sized firms.  This may be either because the objective conditions 
of relatively larger firms are better or because they can better cope with constraints.9 
 
However, an exploration of the full results also gives rise to the notion of the forgotten middle. 
In facing some obstacles to doing business,  medium-sized firms identify themselves as equally 
or even more constrained than do small firms (Table 9-7 and Figure 9-2).  In particular, medium-
sized firms show no statistical difference from small firms in their rating of  several general 
constraints and are significantly more likely to be seriously constrained by tax administration and 
infrastructure.  With regard to infrastructure, large firms show a statistical higher degree of 
constraint than medium and small firms.  These results suggest that policy interventions which 
unduly focus on micro- and/or small enterprises may overlook important constraints to medium-
sized enterprises or all private enterprises.  To focus only on small firms would ignore the plight 
of mid-sized firms. 10   In fact, the complexity characterizing the way in which  different 
                                                 
7 Both OLS and probit models for the different constraints were estimated using firm characteristics as explanatory 
variables, but because of the similar results, only the OLS results are reported.     
8 See Schiffer and Weder (2001).   
9 For a more in-depth analysis of size effects, see the chapter by Beatrice Weder in this volume. 
10 This may be related to a “threshold effect”, where obstacles may not constrain entry so much as they deter growth 
from small to medium size. As Brian Levy (1993) explains, “The threshold burden comprises a discontinuity in the 
structure of costs that results where some fiscal or bureaucratic burden is imposed only on firms above a minimum. 
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obstacles appear to affect different types of enterprises reinforces the rationale for focusing on 
across-the-board reduction of obstacles to businesses, rather than the (often unproductive) 
earmarking of targeted policies according to firms' characteristics, such as size.11 
 
Table 9-7:  Effect of Firm Characteristics on Obstacle Severity:  Results of  Least Square Estimates 
Explanatory variables  Dependent 
variable Small 
Size 
Firm 
Medium 
Size 
Firm 
Firms with 
foreign 
ownership 
Firms with 
government 
control 
Firms 
that 
export 
Located 
in Large 
city 
Located 
in  Small 
city 
N 
Finance a 0.222* 
(0.034) 
0.159* 
(0.031) 
-0.329* 
(0.030) 
0.105* 
(0.036) 
0.065* 
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.029) 
0.055 
(0.034) 
9211 
Taxes and 
regulations  
0.071* 
(0.026) 
0.080* 
(0.026) 
-0.096* 
(0.025) 
-0.169* 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.021) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.018 
(0.028) 
9384 
Inflation a 0.173* 
(0.030) 
0.096* 
(0.027) 
-0.084* 
(0.027) 
-0.076* 
(0.032) 
-0.053** 
(0.022) 
-0.032 
(0.027) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
9111 
Exchange rate a 0.089* 
(0.033) 
0.031 
(0.030) 
0.058** 
(0.028) 
-0.108* 
(0.036) 
0.116* 
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.029) 
0.089* 
(0.034) 
8990 
Corruption a 0.205* 
(0.034) 
0.112* 
(0.031) 
-0.054 
(0.031) 
-0.165* 
(0.037) 
0.003 
(0.025) 
0.016 
(0.031) 
0.029 
(0.036) 
8359 
Tax 
Administration b 
0.053 
(0.032) 
0.063** 
(0.029) 
-0.057** 
(0.028) 
-0.175* 
(0.034) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.028) 
   0.071** 
(0.032) 
9479 
Infrastructureb, c -0.082 
(0.032) 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
0.007 
(0.028) 
-0.128* 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.027) 
0.047 
(0.032) 
9119 
Policy instability 0.041 
(0.032) 
0.035 
(0.029) 
-0.018 
(0.029) 
-0.113* 
(0.034) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
-0.033 
(0.028) 
-0.004 
(0.032) 
9016 
High Taxes b 0.074* 
(0.027) 
0.085* 
(0.029) 
-0.093* 
(0.026) 
-0.238* 
(0.031) 
-0.004 
(0.021) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
0.028 
(0.029) 
9695 
Street Crime  0.188* 
(0.033) 
0.074* 
(0.030) 
-0.077* 
(0.029)  
-0.109* 
(0.035) 
-0.077* 
(0.024) 
-0.003  
(0.029) 
-0.016 
(0.034) 
8801 
Bribes as % of 
sales a 
0.254* 
(0.059) 
0.159* 
(0.055) 
-0.077 
(0.050) 
-0.257* 
(0.072) 
-0.075 
(0.042) 
0.014 
(0.048) 
0.055 
(0.056) 
5234 
*  significant at 1% level;  ** significant at 5% level;  ***  significant at 10% level.     
Note:  All dependent variables are constraints measured on a scale of 1-4 with 4 = major obstacle and 1=no obstacle.  Foreign ownership, export 
orientation, government control are represented by indicator variables with a value of  1 for presence and  0 otherwise.  Firm size and location are 
represented by indicator variables. Large firm size is the omitted category for size; firms in the capital city constitute the omitted category for 
location.  Country dummies have been included in regressions but not reported here. 
acoefficient for small firms is statistically significantly different (higher) than coefficient for small firms using F-test in multiple regression  (a test 
for the statistical significance of the observed differences among the means). 
b coefficient for  medium is statistically significantly different (higher) from coefficient for small firms using F-test in multiple regression 
c coefficient for  large is statistically significantly different (higher) from coefficient for medium and small firms using F-test in multiple 
regression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
size. This discontinuity can lead some firms to rein in expansion – or to expand inefficiently by creating quasi-
independent enterprises, each smaller than the threshold at which the tax and regulatory requirements are imposed.”  
11 Even the qualified generalizations provided above require particular caution when we study a particular country or 
region.  
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Figure 9-2: Tax and Regulatory Constraint by Firm Size (WBES 2000) 
 
 
WHAT CONDITIONS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A HIGHER LEVEL OF 
ENTERPRISE GROWTH?   
 
The WBES results suggest that firms’ evaluation of the severity of the leading constraints  is 
highly related to firm-level outcomes.  An empirical analysis of sales growth at the firm level 
explored whether and how constraints in the business environment, as perceived by enterprises, 
are associated with lower sales growth. This analysis has important ramifications for policy 
makers since, where enterprise growth is correlated with the constraints to business, policies that 
remove these constraints could  lead to growth.  
 
To explore whether and how constraints in the business environment, as perceived by 
enterprises, are associated with sales and investment growth, we estimate two regression models 
which include the constraint rankings for key environment variables.  We control for firm 
attributes such as firm size, export and foreign ownership status, and country differences.12  In 
the first equation, the dependent variable is the sales growth over a three year period (for 
example 1996-1998 or 1997-99) reported by firms in the survey. This variable is regressed on 
key business environment attributes such as corruption, policy instability, taxes and regulations, 
and financing constraints; and on firm level attributes including firm size, age, export status and 
foreign ownership. Firm attributes are all represented by indicator variables. The main attributes 
of the business environment such as financing, corruption, making policy changes and taxes are 
qualitative perceptions in the survey. To better quantify some of these variables, they were all 
converted to binary indicator variables (0,1).  
 
Corruption is measured as the frequency of additional payments made by enterprises on a scale 
of 0-1 with 0 representing the three least frequent responses (never, rarely, sometimes) and 1 
representing the three most frequent responses (always, usually, frequently). Similarly 
                                                 
12 Given the absence of an empirical link between key business environment constraints and growth, the objective 
here is to highlight the associations between different business constraints and growth without making inferences on 
causality. 
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government consultation of businesses on legal and policy reform13 is represented by a binary 
variable representing low frequency:  a value of one indicates a response that such consultation 
“never” or “rarely” occurs. A negative coefficient would imply that more frequent consultation is 
associated with higher growth. High taxes and financing constraints are measured on a scale of 
0-1 with 0 indicating a response of “no obstacle” or “minor obstacle”, and 1 indicating that a 
response of “moderate obstacle” or “major obstacle”.  A negative sign on the coefficient of any 
of these constraint variables, as measured, would reflect the negative relationship between these 
constraints and growth. Since the variables representing the perceptions of the environment are 
significantly correlated with each other, stepwise regression methods were employed to 
determine the most important constraints correlated with growth.14 Firm size, age, export and 
foreign ownership status of firms are represented by indicator variables. Finally indicator 
variables were included to represent country effects.  Te reference country in the table is 
Albania.15  Table 9-8 reports the estimated regression parameters. 
 
Table 9-8: Firm Sales Growth and Constraints to Enterprise Growth (dependent variable, sales   
growth previous three years) 
 
Determinants 
Estimate 
(Standard error) 
Business Constraints :  
Financing  -4.63* 
 (1.64) 
High taxes  -2.04* 
 (0.83) 
Consultation of businesses -1.61* 
 (0.63) 
Corruption -3.95** 
 (1.61) 
Firm Characteristics :  
Medium-sized firm 2.10 
 (1.24) 
Large-sized firm 4.57** 
 (1.96) 
De novo (since 1994) -8.34* 
 (1.1) 
Exporter 19.64* 
 (2.02) 
Foreign investment 1.04 
                                                 
13 The question asked was: “In case of important changes in laws or policies affecting my business operation, the 
government takes into account concerns voiced either by me or by my business association.” 
14 The approach for stepwise inclusion/exclusion of variables was to maintain certain control variables for firm 
characteristics whether or not they were significant, but to retain constraint/policy variables only if they had a 
significant coefficient.    Thus tables 9-8 and 9-9 are reporting the outcome of a lengthy set of steps leading to a 
single final specification.   
15 Since there were 80 countries and one territory in the sample, this required 80 country indicators (for each 
country/territory other than Albania—which, owing to alphabetical ordering, served as the base case).  Country 
control variables were used to pick up potentially omitted factors specific to a country that would influence the 
overall response (such as recent civil war, different culture).  Thus the coefficients on constraint scores can be 
interpreted as the associated difference in growth levels with variations in these conditions (and by inference policy 
differences) at the national level. 
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 2.13 
Constant 14.822 
 (11.24) 
Adjusted R2 0.12 
Number of Observations 4560 
** : significant at 1% ; * : significant at 5%  
Country indicators were included in the above regression. Estimates are available from authors on 
request. 
 
First,  firm attributes, including firm size and the export status of firms,  are positively and 
significantly associated with higher sales growth, while age of the firm is negatively associated 
with growth. This finding is consistent with the literature.16 Second, and more importantly, the 
results indicate that several business constraints are significantly associated with sales growth 
(after controlling for country differences and variations in firm attributes---including age, size, 
export and foreign ownership status).17  Financing, high taxes and corruption (which are, on 
average, moderate to major constraints to businesses) are significantly and negatively associated 
with sales growth. Lack of or infrequent consultation of businesses on policies that affect them 
also bears a negative relationship with growth.   
 
In the second specification, the dependent variable is change in investment over a three year  
period (again, typically 1996-99) reported by firms in the survey. As in the earlier model, this 
variable is regressed on key business environment attributes such as corruption, policy 
instability, taxes and regulations, and financing constraints, as well as firm level attributes 
including firm size, age, export status and foreign ownership. As before, constraints are 
represented by indicator variables (0,1) where 0 represents “no obstacle or minor obstacle” and 1 
represents “moderate or major obstacle”. The results of the regression are reported in Table 9-9. 
Policy uncertainty in this regression is measured by changes in predictability of government 
policies, laws and regulations over the last 3 years, where a 1 indicates no change or a decline in 
predictability and a zero indicates an improvement in predictability18. 
 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Batra and Tan (forthcoming);  Roberts  and  Tybout  (1996).  
17 For example, the coefficient for finance suggests that a firm which identifies itself as constrained to a moderate or 
major degree by financing, on average, reports a growth rate that is 4.63 percentage points lower than one which is 
not so constrained (other things equal). A firm seriously constrained by corruption reports, on average, a growth rate 
3.95 percent lower than one which is not so constrained. 
18 The question was, “In the last three years, the laws, regulations and policies affecting my business have become: 
(1)much more predictable (2) somewhat more predictable (3) unchanged (4) somewhat less predictable (5) much 
less predictable.” 
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Table 9-9: Firm Investment and Constraints to Enterprise Growth 
(dependent variable: investment growth previous three years) 
 
Determinants Estimate (Standard error) 
Business Constraints :  
Financing  -2.46* 
 (0.62) 
High taxes  -1.69** 
 (0.73) 
Predictability of policies -3.75* 
 (1.47) 
Corruption -2.57*** 
 (1.45) 
Firm Characteristics :  
Medium-sized firm 2.30 
 (1.51) 
Large-sized firm 2.07 
 (2.01) 
De novo (since 1994) -4.93* 
 (1.02) 
Exporter 10.62* 
 (1.75) 
Foreign investment 0.38 
 1.84 
Constant 46.34* 
 (9.19) 
Adjusted R2 0.13 
Number of Observations 3006 
*** : significant at 1% ; ** : significant at 5%; *=Significant at 10% level. 
Country indicators were included in the above regression. Estimates are available from authors on request. 
 
 
First, analyzing the firm attributes, it is clear that younger firms and firms that export have higher 
investment growth than older firms and non-exporters, on average. Among the business 
environment attributes, a decline in predictability of changes in economic policies over the last 
three years, corruption, high taxes and financing are significantly and negatively associated with 
investment growth.  
 
Taken  together, the implications of these findings are important. At the most basic level they 
suggest that several of the constraints firms rated as most important are significantly related to 
the actual performance of firms. Second, they imply that, other things equal, in countries with 
poor conditions in four categories—financing, corruption, high taxes and business consultation— 
existing businesses’ sales grow an average total of over ten percentage points less than those 
with positive ratings in all of these categories. Countries with poor conditions in the areas of 
financing, high taxes, corruption, and policy predictability saw their businesses’ investment 
levels grow an average of more than ten percentage points less than those with positive ratings in 
all of these categories.  These results are strongly suggestive of the magnitude of benefits 
obtainable with substantial improvements in policy.  While it may be difficult and take years to 
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reform taxes, financing, corruption, and policy predictability, the evidence suggests that higher 
growth and investment are associated with such improvements.  
 
WHY DO FIRMS SO FREQUENTLY OPT TO FUNCTION UNOFFICIALLY?   
 
The WBES results make clear that there is a spectrum of formality from the wholly official to the 
mostly unofficial (although all WBES firms are officially registered).  A large share of officially 
registered firms hide output and turn unofficial in many countries.  The worldwide enterprise 
data set permits us to test the extent to which firms are hiding output, and the importance of the 
various potential business environment conditions  associated with their decision to do so. It is 
worth noting that  all the firms in our sample are  officially registered.  We asked each firm to 
provide an estimate of the percentage of sales revenues  that firms like  their own report. Based 
on  their responses, we infer that the firms in the sample do not report 19 percent of their gross 
revenues. 
 
One can hypothesize that the decision of a firm to hide its output may be related to the low 
benefits it derives from operating officially, and the low cost of crossing over to the unofficial 
economy.19 In this formulation, the firm makes a rational economic choice as to whether (or how 
much) to operate officially or unofficially based on the incentive it faces.  These incentives are 
determined by the government’s provision of (or failure to provide) public goods (such as rule of 
law). Within such a framework, the analysis uses the WBES microeconomic data set to identify 
the main determinants of the unofficial economy. 
 
To do so, we performed OLS regressions with this firm-level sample, including country effects. 
The basic econometric specifications in Table 9-10 present the various possible determinants of 
the unofficial economy behavior of registered firms. A number of policy-related variables are 
shown to be significantly related to the firm’s extent of underreporting of revenues. On the 
economic and financial policy side, macroeconomic, regulatory, and tax constraints are 
significant, other things equal.  Where these policies are more constraining, a firm will tend to 
operate unofficially. Further, governance-related constraints are important. In particular, 
corruption and problems in some legal variables related to property rights protection—such as 
copyright violations—are rather significant in determining the propensity of a firm to operate 
unofficially. 
 
The econometric investigation at the firm level also allows investigation of whether enterprise 
characteristics matter as well (controlling for policy and governance variables). As seen in Table 9-10, 
small or medium firms that produce for the domestic market (non-exporters), lack foreign investment, and 
are located in large cities (but not necessarily in the capital) tend to engage more in unofficial activity.20 
                                                 
19 This analysis draws from the framework presented by Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) for the unofficial 
economy in transition, subsequently extended for 69 countries worldwide (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 
1999; Friedman and others 2000). 
20 By contrast, the coefficients for new firms, sector dummies, and private ownership are insignificant, implying 
that, controlling for other factors, a firm’s age, sector, or mode of ownership are not explanatory factors in the extent 
of the firm’s underreporting. 
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Table 9-10. Underreported Revenues, Corruption, and Protection of Property Rights (using full sample) 
Determinants 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Business constraints       
Financing constraint 0.27 0.11 0.46 0.44 0.27 0.09 
 0.85 0.33 1.44+ 1.32 0.79 0.25 
Inflation constraint –0.01 –0.03 0.07 0.01 –0.05 –0.09 
 –0.03 –0.12 0.31 0.04 –0.23 –0.37 
Policy instability constraint 0.60 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.65 0.81 
      2.64***   3.24*** 3.48***    3.55*** 2.78*** 3.30*** 
Infrastructure constraint 0.58 0.37 0.75 0.88 0.73 0.51 
 1.65+ 0.98 2.15**    2.44** 2.00** 1.29 
Tax/regulatory constraint 1.37    1.26  
      3.38***    2.97***  
Rule of law       
Bribery (% of revenues) 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.37 
      5.47***   5.53*** 5.70***   6.17***   5.91*** 5.97*** 
Copyrights violations  2.31    2.36 
    7.31***    7.11*** 
Firm characteristics       
Private ownership 0.24 –0.52 0.23 0.25 0.24 –0.55 
 0.20 –0.39 0.19 0.21 0.20 –0.41 
Small firm o 4.35 4.28 4.40 4.50 4.47 4.54 
      4.43***   4.07*** 4.48***   4.38***   4.35*** 4.13*** 
Medium-sized firm * 0.93 1.18 0.97 0.84 0.78 1.07 
 1.05 1.25 1.09 0.91 0.85 1.09 
 Relatively new (since 1994) –0.14 –0.02 –0.13 –0.05 –0.07 0.10 
 –0.28 –0.05 –0.26 –0.10 –0.13 0.18 
Exporter –0.46 –1.02 –0.54 –1.00 –0.90 –1.16 
 –0.65 –1.33 –0.76 –1.32 –1.19 –1.41 
Foreign investment –3.53 –3.24 –3.58 –3.40 –3.38 –3.06 
     –4.28***  –3.67***  –4.33***  –4.00***  –3.97*** –3.35*** 
Location, small city ** –0.18 –0.13 –0.17 –0.09 –0.11 –0.07 
 –0.18 –0.12 –0.18 –0.08 –0.11 –0.07 
Location, large city ** 1.62 1.41 1.61 1.87 1.87 1.72 
  1.87*  1.51+  1.87*  2.11** 2.11**   1.79* 
Manufacturing ***    1.72 1.56 2.06 
    0.84 0.77 0.91 
Service ***    –0.10 –0.04 1.65 
    –0.04 –0.02 0.62 
Agriculture ***    –0.52 –0.57 0.55 
    –0.26 –0.28 0.24 
Construction ***    1.98 1.87 2.16 
    0.91 0.86 0.90 
Adjusted R2 .22 .23 .21 .22 .22 .23 
Number of observations 4775 4166 4781 4386 4381 3802 
***  significant at 1%  level; **  significant at 5% level ; * significant at 10% level + significant at 15% level 
Dependent variable, underreported revenues (in %, sample mean = 19%). 
Notes : From the survey, business constraints were rated on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 implies “no constraint” and 4 “major obstacle”. These 
include inflation, financing, infrastructure, tax/regulation, policy instability constraints, as well as quality of courts, protection of property 
rights, copyright violations, and constraints to exercise ‘voice’ of the firm. Bribery is expressed as percentage of revenues. Fixed country 
effects were used for all countries, except for Latvia (benchmark) to account for differences across individual countries. World averages were 
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used for some variables in those countries that were entirely missing observations for that specific variable, in order to maximize the efficiency 
of estimators without affecting their lack of bias. All firm characteristics are defined as a binary choice. 
o Large firms constitute the benchmark; oo Location in capital constitutes the benchmark; ooo  Other sectors constitute the benchmark 
Source: Kaufmann, Mastruzzi, and Zavaleta 2001.  
 
 
WHAT MAKES REFORMS SO DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY IN COUNTRIES WITH 
INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE FIRMS? 
 
In a number of countries, some influential firms are business environment “makers”, and thus 
form and shape policies, laws and regulations favorable to their private interests, sometimes 
through illicit means.  Traditional measures of corruption derived from enterprise survey 
questions focus on the implementation of laws and regulations, and illuminate, in particular, the 
extent of administrative bribery.  However, the transition economy version of the WBES (the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance, or “BEEPS” survey) went further;  it 
assessed the extent to which countries may have experienced good or poor governance in the 
formation and shaping of the policies, laws, and regulations.21  
 
This research suggests the existence of a significant extent of state capture by the corrupt 
interests of the enterprise elite in about half  the countries in transition (particularly in the CIS, 
but also in CEE).  In those countries, the policies, laws and regulations of the state are reported 
to have been shaped to a large extent by some firms that have made corrupt payments. The 
impact of such state capture on the business and investment climate is very large.   Analysis 
indicates that firms in countries that avoided  state capture grow much faster and invest 
significantly more than those subject to state capture.22  Equally important, firms that are 
“captors” appear, in capture economies, to benefit dramatically from their insider status (figure 
9-3).  This suggests that liberalizing reforms, which may remove rents and protections, may be 
resisted not only by public officials, but also by powerful private elites. 
 
This finding has a fundamental policy implication. If, indeed, some firms are not only mere 
investment climate “takers” but investment climate “makers,” conventional advice to 
government officials as to what rules and regulations to reform will continue to have limited 
impact in those settings subject to state capture by  vested interests. Thus the WBES/BEEPS 
indicators of capture provide a new tool in assessing whether preconditions for successful reform 
efforts prevail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Hellman and Kaufmann  (2001). 
22 Hellman and Kaufmann (2001)  For background research on state capture in transition, and for interactive access 
to this dataset, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/ 
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Figure 9-3: Effect of “State Capture” on Enterprise Growth 
 
 
IS CORRUPTION LESS HARMFUL TO BUSINESS OPERATION WHEN IT IS 
PREDICTABLE?   
 
The prevalence of corruption matters enormously in the firm’s behavior and performance, yet 
analysis of WBES data suggests that the unpredictability of bribery or corruption does not matter 
significantly, controlling for the corruption level. This helps to resolve a source of great debate in 
development literature.  While, in general, the literature treating corruption presents it as a 
negative factor in development23, some authors claim it is the unpredictability of its costs, rather 
than the existence or level of corruption, that discourages development.24 Predictability of 
corruption is characterized by the bribe payer and receiver both knowing “what it takes” in terms 
of the nature and amount of payment required, and the degree of certainty that the privately 
purchased “service” from the official will actually be delivered.  The premise is that in settings 
where corruption is predictable, corruption would   have fewer harmful effects: it is, quite 
literally, business as usual. However, in settings where the degree of unpredictability of 
corruption is much higher, the effects of corruption would be much more harmful. 
 
The WBES firm-level dataset permits an empirical evaluation of the “unpredictability of 
corruption” hypothesis. The authors tested it using three separate variables derived from 
responses to the WBES. One indicated  uncertainty about the price of corrupt services, one 
indicated uncertainty about whether other officials may subsequently request additional bribe 
payments, and  one indicated uncertainty about whether bribes result in the actual delivery of 
purchased services. As reported in Table  9-11 below, we find that controlling for other factors, 
                                                 
23 See Rose-Ackerman (1978), Klitgaard (1988), Shleifer and Vishny, (1994), Mauro (1997). 
24In other words, in settings where corruption is predictable, the premise is that corruption would not have harmful effects 
compared to where the degree of unpredictability of corruption is much higher. See, for example, Campos, Lien, and Pradhan 
(1999).   
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there is no significant relationship between the degree of unpredictability of corruption, on the 
one hand, and the degree of underreporting of revenues by the firm, on the other. By contrast, the 
magnitude and significance of the level of corruption variables (proxied by the amounts of bribes 
paid or by the frequency of bribery) remain very high. These results occur irrespective of which 
(and if any) of the three “unpredictability of corruption” components is used in  our econometric 
specifications.25 
 
Table 9-11: Underreported Revenues versus Unpredictability of Corruption 
Determinants 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Business constraints       
Financing constraint -0.04 0.42 0.30 0.11 -0.12 0.24 
 -0.11 1.16 0.67 0.26 -0.30 0.67 
Inflation constraint -0.15 -0.12 -0.31 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 
 -0.52 -0.49 -0.99 -0.32 0.10 -0.18 
Policy instability constraint 0.77 0.74 0.82 0.58 0.51 0.55 
      2.76***      2.94***      2.71***    2.05**  1.90*    2.23** 
Infrastructure constraint 0.89 0.68 0.80 0.39 0.42 0.22 
    2.07**  1.72+  1.75* 0.91 1.04 0.59 
Tax/regulatory constraint 1.30 1.25 1.40 0.73 0.76 0.80 
    2.44**      2.72***    2.50** 1.39  1.51+  1.78* 
Unpredictability of corruption       
Bribery (% of revenues) 0.28 0.29 0.27    
      4.68***      4.91***     4.38***    
Frequency of bribing    2.16 1.84 2.01 
         6.90***      6.23***      8.07*** 
Corrupt service unpredictability   -0.01 0.44   
   -0.03  1.51+   
Corrupt payment unpredictability 0.01    0.26  
 0.03    0.95  
Corrupt extra request unpredictability  -0.10    0.10 
  -0.37    0.40 
Government inefficiency    1.30 1.39 1.05 
         3.28***      3.59***      3.01*** 
Firm characteristics       
Private ownership -0.44 0.10 -0.11 0.05 -0.97 -0.44 
 -0.32 0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.75 -0.36 
Small firm 4.42 4.94 5.23 5.50 4.60 4.75 
       3.43***      4.49***      3.63***      4.06***      3.71***      4.40*** 
Medium-sized firm 0.84 0.97 2.01 2.26 1.18 0.89 
 0.73 0.98 1.54+ 1.84* 1.06 0.92 
 Relatively new (since 1994) -0.23 0.19 -0.20 0.09 0.04 0.36 
 -0.36 0.35 -0.31 0.15 0.07 0.67 
Exporter -0.89 -1.30 -1.59 -1.22 -0.53 -1.18 
 -0.97 -1.60+ -1.57+ -1.29 -0.61 -1.49+ 
                                                 
25 In Table 9-2 we also find similar results to those reported in Table 9-1 in terms of which firm characteristics matter, controlling 
for other factors.  Firms that are not large (small or medium-sized), produce for the domestic market (non-exporters), lack foreign 
investment, and are privately owned, tend to engage more in unofficial activity. By contrast, the coefficients for both de novo 
firms and for location are insignificant, implying that, controlling for other factors, neither the firm’s age nor its location of 
headquarters is a determinant. 
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Foreign investment -3.64 -3.37 -3.88 -3.07 -2.81 -2.92 
      -3.42***     -3.69***     -3.24***     -2.75***      -2.76***      -3.26*** 
Location, small city -0.13 0.18 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
 -0.11 0.16 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Location, large city 1.42 2.18 1.38 1.24 1.29 1.53 
 1.36    2.26** 1.25 1.20 1.31  1.65+ 
Manufacturing 1.81 1.94 1.97 1.74 1.82 2.04 
 0.85 0.93 0.69 0.62 0.83 0.95 
Service 0.34 0.38 0.24 0.67 1.05 1.14 
 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.22 0.42 0.46 
Agriculture -0.64 -0.04 -0.63 0.18 0.50 0.66 
 -0.30 -0.02 -0.22 0.07 0.23 0.31 
Construction 1.39 1.70 1.62 1.63 1.73 1.73 
 0.60 0.77 0.54 0.56 0.74 0.75 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.20 
Number of observations 3262 3902 2926 3347 3369 4223 
*** significant at 1%  level; ** significant at 5% level ; * significant at 10% level + significant at 15% level 
Note: From the survey, business constraints were rated on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 implies no constraint and 4 implies a major obstacle. These 
include inflation, financing, infrastructure, tax/regulation, policy instability constraints, as well as quality of courts, protection of property rights, 
copyright violations and constraints to exercise ‘voice’ of the firm. Bribery is expressed as percentage of revenues. Although not reported in 
table, fixed country effects were used to account for differences across individual countries. World averages were used for some variables in 
those countries that were entirely missing observations for that specific variable, in order to maximize the efficiency of estimators without 
affecting their lack of bias. Finally, all firm characteristics are defined as a binary choice. 
o Large firms constitute the benchmark; oo Location in capital constitutes the benchmark; ooo Other sectors constitute the benchmark 
Source: Kaufmann,  Mastruzzi, and Zavaleta  2002. 
 
Implications   
 
The results of the World Business Environment Survey show that important dimensions of the 
climate for business operation and investment can be measured, analyzed, and compared across 
countries, and that important aspects of governance are centrally related to the business 
environment and investment climate. The results clearly demonstrate how the experience of 
enterprises varies by location and by firm characteristic, and the analysis reveals how those 
differences relate to firm-level outcomes such as growth and the extent of unofficialdom.  A 
careful interpretation of these differences  can help shape different policy priorities for national 
policy.  Further, the survey findings suggest that key policy, institutional, and governance 
indicators are connected to important outcomes, including the growth of firm’s sales  (as well as 
the growth of investment and the extent to which firms operate in the unofficial or informal 
economy).  The results also point to the value of monitoring such indicators over time, because 
progress in these indicators should yield real improvements in enterprise performance.  
 
In particular, the WBES provides empirical confirmation for some commonly held truths, while 
providing little evidence for others.  For example, it provides a clear connection between 
taxation, financing and corruption on the one hand, and growth and investment on the other. It 
suggests the role of systematic consultation of key economic stakeholders in providing an 
effective environment for firm growth, while policy uncertainty may be importantly related to 
investment.  Conversely, it highlights the costs to economies where the state is captured by a 
narrow set of private interests. 
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This survey also discourages universal generalizations. Rather, it’s value lies precisely in 
shedding light on  the enormous variance in the nature and severity of different types of 
constraints across countries and regions, as well as between firms of different characteristics.  
This variance implies that the global generalizations regarding the severity of a particular 
constraint  are of limited value. It also suggests the importance of “unbundling” generic clusters 
of constraints.  Although two countries may have severe  regulatory or governance constraints, 
for example, the components may be quite different in each country.   The detail afforded by the 
survey also suggests that generalizations about firm size and formality may benefit from a 
nuanced analysis of actual conditions.    
 
The WBES data on state capture raise an important policy caution:  Poor conditions may in fact  
work to the benefit of some firms.  They may be the result of  the companies’ efforts to shape 
policies affecting them through their illicit or licit influence.  In such contexts, conventional 
advice to government officials regarding reforms of rules and regulations will have limited 
impact, because of state capture by vested interests. 
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APPENDIX A.  COUNTRIES SURVEYED IN 
THE WORLD BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY** 
 
Central and Eastern (CEE) 
Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
 
Developing East Asia 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
 
Newly Industrialized East Asia (NIC) and China 
China, Malaysia, and  Singapore 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, and Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. 
 
Middle East and North Africa 
Egypt, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza (region) 
 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)** 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. 
 
South Asia 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
Regions Classified as Developing = Developing East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Transition Economies = CEE plus CIS 
 
**Japan was not surveyed because of the expense.
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